

RESOLVING THE REDACTIONAL AMBIVALENCE OVER THE ROLE OF PATRIMONIALISM IN THE COLLAPSE OF MONARCHY IN ISRAEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIAN DEMOCRACY

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Abstract.

In 930 BC when Israel broke up into two kingdoms, the Deuteronomistic redactors raised alarm on the revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty which retained rulership over the two tribes of the southern kingdom. Thus, there was the repeated reference to “the sin which Jeroboam, son of Nebat made Israel to sin” (1 King 16:19, 25, 31). While this reference is often made in relation to the setting up of two altars, one in Dan and the other in Beersheba, the central concern of the Deuteronomistic redactors was that the motive of unifying the nation under David the King par excellence, had been defeated. Thus when the Northern Kingdom with its ten tribes collapsed in 721 BC under the terrific military assaults of the Assyrian war lord, Shalmanesser V, the Deuteronomistic redactors seemed to have been vindicated that יהוה had punished severely those who revolted against Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The southern kingdom thus became the centre for repentance and unification. The eventual collapse of the southern kingdom under assault by Nebuchadnezzar in 605 BC thus became an enigma that defied explanation. Internal evidence however shows that the support for patrimonialism in monarchy in Israel was not unanimous and universal. Thus Rehoboam was restrained from waging a war against the revolting Israelite party under Jeroboam, because, according to the word from the Prophet Shemaiah, the war was unnecessary as יהוה had a hand in the rebellion against Davidic patrimonial dynasty, thus betraying the ambivalence of יהוה over patrimonial monarchy. This paper espouses the redactional ambivalence over patrimonialism as a factor in the collapse of monarchy in Israel. It goes ahead to see how the patrimonial orientation is threatening to upturn the practice of democracy in Nigeria. A section of the Nigerian polity has a world view that posits a fused religio-political system in which leadership is a matter of patrimonial bequeathal through a singular religio-political authority, to the extent that to contravene that world view is to threaten the unity of the country, and hence its survival as a geo-political entity.

Introduction

Patrimonialism is a social system in which a royal elite rules through personal and arbitrary control over a bureaucracy and over slaves, mercenaries and conscripts who have no power themselves, but serve only to enforce the monarch's rule. Although the system started in the medieval centuries, traces of it can still be seen today in Asia and China in particular, as well as parts of the Middle East. Patrimonialism is a form of governance in which all power flows directly from the leader. This constitutes the blending of the public and private sector. The regime is usually autocratic and oligarchic and excludes the upper and middle classes from power.

According to Weber (1922), patrimonialism is a form of political domination in which authority rests on the personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a royal household, where that power is formally arbitrary and under the direct control of the ruler. This implies that the domination is secured by means of a political apparatus staffed by slaves, mercenaries, conscripts, or some other group, which has no independent power base. By controlling the instruments of power in

this way, the patrimonial ruler can extend personal grace and favours, at the expense of traditional limitations on the exercise of authority. Sometimes, an extreme development of the ruler's discretion occurs, making the patrimonial authority to shade into what Weber (1992) describes as sultanism. Gifford (1998) describes this system as prevalent in African states making them different from western societies which rest on another type of authority described by Weber (1992) as rational-legal authority. In the latter system, according to Gifford (1998), "power has come to be exercised through legally defined structures, for a publicly acknowledged aim". (p. 5). The officials who operate the structures of this latter system are those who, according to Gifford (1998), "in exercising the power of office, treat other individuals impersonally, according to criteria which the structure demands". (p. 5).

Initially, patrimonialism was centered on family structures, particularly on the authority of fathers within families, a system commonly called patriarchy. However, patriarchy only describes the early, more restricted form of patrimonialism. Patrimonial monarchies and similar forms of government, according to Weber (1992) were projections of patriarchy (the rule of the father within the family) unto a broader set of social relationships.

In recent times, a new trend in patrimonialism has been identified. Tagged Neopatrimonialism, it describes a system of social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population. It is an informal patron-client relationship that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in small villages. According to Eisenstadt (1973), neopatrimonialism is a system of rule based on administrative and military personnel, who were responsible only to the ruler. Neopatrimonialism, which is a modern form of the traditional patrimonial form of rule, is a mixed system. Here, elements of patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule coexist and are sometimes interwoven.

Patrimonial Monarchy in Israel

When the Prophet Samuel was giving the elders of Israel a preview of the character of the kind of monarchy they were asking for, which was, in fact, a D redactional, post-exilic reflection on the collapsed monarchy, he was, in effect, giving a vivid description of patrimonial monarchy. The D redactor was, in retrojective retrospection, giving the reason for the collapse of monarchy, thus;

He said: these will be the ways of the king who will reign over you: he will take your sons and appoint them to his chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and some to plough his ground and to reap his harvest, and to make his implements of war and the equipment of his chariots. He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive orchards and give them to his servants. He will take the tenth of your grain and of your vineyards and give it to his officers and to his servants. He will take your menservants and maidservants and the best of your castle and your asses and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your flocks, and you shall be his slaves. And in that day, you will cry out because of your king, whom you have chosen for yourselves; but the Lord will not answer you in that day (1 Samuel 8:18).

A number of issues are worthy of note in this description. One is the specific character of patrimonial system which, according to Adams (2005), entails private appropriation of public office. Here, one sees a legitimization of this private appropriation for instance; your sons (Hebrew בְּנֵיכֶם) to his chariot (Heb. כֶּבֶתוֹ) some to plough his ground, (Heb. וְלִתְּרֵשֶׁתָּהּ יִשׁוּ) and reap his harvest, (Hebrew וְלִקְצֹרְקָהּ צִירֹו). See also the legitimate contribution of the (a tenth), (Hebrew יָעֵשֶׂר) meaning, he shall tithe), implying a systematized private appropriation of resources. There is however more evidence to believe that the admonition above was retrojected, and was in fact a redactive reflection on the collapsed monarchy in the post-exilic period.

Monarchy in Israel, in fact, started in a patrimonial structure with Saul as the first King. A survey of Saul's royal table in 1 Samuel 20:25 confirms this: "The king sat upon this seat, as at other times, upon the seat by wall; Jonathan sat opposite, and Abner sat by Saul's side, but David's place was empty". A closer look at this will reveal a patrimonial setting. Jonathan, Saul's son was actually second in command to the king. Abner, the Army Commander was the king's cousin, and David the Commander of the internal Brigade of Guards was the king's son-in-law.

Besides Saul's enquiry in 1 Sam. 22:7-8 suggest a situation in which servants and officers in government extorted land and precious items from the citizenry in a patrimonial system:

And Saul said to his servants who stood about him; Hear now, you Benjamites; will the son of Jesse give every one of you fields and vineyards, will he make you all commanders of thousands and commanders of hundreds, that all of you have conspired against me? No one discloses to me when my son makes a league with the son of Jesse; none of you is sorry for me or discloses to me that my son has stirred up my servant against me, to lie in wait, as at this day.

Dietrich (2007) has pointed out that;

The text does not say from where he took these lands. It stands to reason that they were not his own, or that of his family; these lands would not have been large enough, and the Benjamites, according to the words used, were no stewards of royal lands but rather owners of their own lands and vineyards. It seems that Saul prouided them with land or allowed them to provide themselves with land that either was without owner or that was taken from previous owners. (p. 190).

The second point that is evident in that address is that the officials are addressed as "You Benjamites" (Hebrew בְּנֵי־יָמִי). This implies that of the twelve tribes of Israel, only the Benjamites formed the core officials of the government. Nothing can be more confirmatory of a patrimonial system.

The third point was that Saul was already whipping up sectional sentiments against "the son of Jesse" (Heb. בֶּן־יֵשׁוּ), an issue which lies at the heart of Saul's bitter vexation against David, and his misunderstanding of Jonathan (his son)'s agreement with David. Saul was already envisaging a break in his patrimonial dynasty and a transfer of the throne to the house of Jesse. This had become more apparent since David's brilliant outing against the Philistian war lord, Goliath of Gath. Saul already had eyes on a patrimonial arrangement in which power was going to pass down smoothly to his son Jonathan. But Jonathan, by Saul's rating, was too naïve to understand the power inter-play, and was busy hanging around David.

Eventually, it was not very clear whether it was Saul that יהוה had rejected as king or the patrimonial system which he was forming. For while Saul was still on the throne, the prophet had been instructed by יהוה to go and anoint (Heb. מָשַׁח) one of the house of Jesse the Bethlehemite, David by name, as king in his place (1 Samuel 16:1ff). Saul and Jonathan were to die later in war. However, Abner, the commander of Saul's army and Saul's cousin, sustained power in the house of Saul, albeit in the Northern kingdom, for seven years and six months. Abner eventually met with David, who, all the while after Saul's death, was king in the southern kingdom. Abner officially surrendered the remnant of Saul's patrimony to David, and a new dynasty was to begin.

Redactive Conflict in the Patrimonial Narrative

But the monarchy narrative actually started in 1 Samuel 8:1ff. There, the actual reason for the demand for a king was given:

When Samuel became old, he made his sons judges over Israel. The name of his first-born son was Joel, and the name of his second, Abijah; they were judges in Beersheba. Yet his sons did not walk in his ways but turned aside after gain; they took bribes and perverted justice. Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah, and said to him "Behold, you are old and your sons do not walk in your ways; now appoint for us a king to govern us like all the nations.

The impression is given here that the demand for a king was prompted by the fact that Samuel's sons whom he had already put into office as judges were not administering well. The implication of this is two-fold. One, Samuel practiced a kind of patrimonial system in which the next in command to him were his sons. Samuel was already orchestrating a smooth transition of power from himself to his sons. Two, Samuel's patrimonial system would have been established if his sons had done well. Thus, the demand for a king was not necessitated by the desire to be like other nations, as was alleged. It was prompted simply by the fact that Samuel's sons whom he placed in authority in a patrimonial administrative system were not administering creditably. In other words, it was not Samuel's patrimonial system that was rejected. It was Samuel's sons that were discredited.

Three issues therefore stand out in the patrimonial narratives as they affect monarchy in Israel. One, the three key personalities involved in the monarchical history in Israel, namely, Samuel, Saul and David practiced patrimonialism. Two, each of the three personalities practised or at least envisioned a dynasty which had strong chances of success. Three, the prophetic party which permanently entrenched the Davidic patrimonial dynasty were but a redactive ploy employed by the D redactors who favoured patrimonialism over and above the redactors who were opposed to it. The collapsed of the northern kingdom in 721 BC was to the D redactors a confirmation of the anger of יהוה against the opposers of the patrimonial system. However, when the southern kingdom also collapsed in 605BC, bringing an end to the monarchy, that view was debunked, and a new reason had to be sought for the collapse of the monarchy. This new reason was to be crafted in the Chronicles and the Ezra-Nehemiah reforms. With this at the background, we can now look more closely at the event in 1 Kings 12: 1ff, the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty.

The Revolt Against Davidic Patrimonial Dynasty: The Redactional Conflict.

Let it be placed on record that the Davidic patrimonial dynasty became entrenched in Israelite monarchy by a redactional craft woven around the prophetic party, led by Nathan in 2 Samuel 7:1ff.

Now, when the king dwelt in his house, and the Lord had given him rest from all his enemies round about, the king said to Nathan the prophet, “See now, I dwell in a house of cedar, but the ark of God dwells in a tent. And Nathan said to the king, “Go, do all that is in your heart for the Lord is with you”. But that same night the word of the Lord came to Nathan: Go and tell my servant, David, “Thus saith the Lord: would you build me a house to dwell in? Moreover the Lord declares to you that the Lord will make you a house. And your house and your kingdom shall be made sure forever before me; your throne shall be established forever.

For good or ill this was interpreted to mean the permanence of the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. This was long before the event of 1 Kings 12 which heralded the split of the kingdom and significantly the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The antecedent to the event of 1 Kings 12, the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty, was the reign of Solomon. The description of the patrimonial appropriation of issues of public office to private end, as stated in 1Kings 8:11, reached a classical apogee in Solomon. The king had married seven hundred wives and had three hundred concubines. And he maintained his large family with state resources, since in the patrimonial system there is no difference between the state fund and the ruler’s treasury. The heavy cost of maintaining his family including the cost of building the temple and palace brought heavy taxation on the citizenry. If there was any time the people should have rebelled against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty it was under Solomon. But somehow, the influence of David and the prophetic party managed to sustain the patrimonialism, but the euphoria was gradually dying down. This forms the basis for understanding the revolt against Davidic patrimonial dynasty in 1 Kings 12.

Thus, in 1 Kings 12, under Rehoboam, Solomon’s son, the elders came to meet the king to solicit for a reduction in tasks and taxes. The reference was made directly to the reign of Solomon; “Your father (Hebrew דָּוִד, referring to Solomon) made our yoke heavy. Now therefore lighten the hard service of your father and his heavy yoke upon us, and we will serve you”. (1Kings 12:4). The report went ahead to show that while Rehoboam obtained leave from the delegation prior to his answer, he took counsel with two different parliaments or advisory councils; namely, the one that served his father Solomon which he apparently inherited, and the one that he himself constituted upon ascending to power. This would appear like a bicameral parliament, the upper house and the lower house. Nyirimana (2001) has explained that:

A pattern characteristic of patrimonialism has been the emergence of small groups of very influential people surrounding the heads of states, often closely related to them. In many cases, this group grows so powerful that they come to constitute an unofficial nerve centre of state power, masterminding decisions that neither the head of state nor any other constituted organ can overrule. (p. 714).

In the case of Rehoboam, it was a bicameral kind of consultative assembly, and the monarch was really helpless on his own, and had no option than to echo the decision of the consultative council. Nyirimana went ahead to observe that:

One of the corollaries of patrimonialism that pervaded political leadership in Israel was the tendency observed among the people surrounding the king to cling to the privileges

that they enjoyed by virtue of their kinship relationship to the king. These people would endeavour to hold on to power, which they deemed to be a property of their tribe, and were very reluctant to release it. This attitude is observed with the Benjamites when Abner suggested the transfer of power from Saul's house to David's. Abner knew that it was not enough to ask Ishbaal to resign, he also needed to convince the house of Benjamin to release the throne (2 Sam. 3:19). (p. 718).

The Redactional Conflict: The Ambivalence of יהוה

The real redactional conflict in the narrative is seen in the two voices heard through the two consultative councils. The first council is called "The old men who stood before Solomon his father" (Hebrew (הַזִּקְנִים שֶׁ־רָדוּ יְהוֹנָדָן יִמָּא תִּפְנִישׁ לְמֶה אָבִיו)).

This council is no doubt the same prophetic party, led by Nathan, which had prophetically entrenched the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. This was the party originally designated as the mouthpiece of יהוה .

The second council is called "the young men who had grown up with him and stood before him" (Hebrew (עֲלֵלֵד יִמָּא שֶׁ־רָדוּ לֹא אֲתוּא שֶׁ־רָדוּ עִמָּו דִּים לְפָנָיו)). This was the council which he himself had assembled upon ascending unto power. But this was also in every respect a contemporary patrimonial council. The issue at stake, basically, was the private appropriation of public office which is a central factor in patrimonialism. The matter was that Rehoboam's father had excessive private appropriation of public office which brought a heavy yoke on the people. The request was for a reduced private appropriation of public office and hence a reduction of the yoke of the people. The prophetic party which had favoured the permanence of Davidic patrimonial dynasty foresaw a revolt and sought to soft pedal in order to avoid the revolt against the house of David already permanently established by the counsel of יהוה.

The council of young men, equally ardent supporters of the patrimonial system sought for a maintenance of the *statusquo ante*, that is the present level of private appropriation of public office. This time יהוה favoured the council of the young men in a decision that would engender a revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty, an action which was to confirm the word of יהוה by another prophetic party (1 Kings 12:29). A closer examination of the narrative would reveal a conflict which, rather than betraying the ambivalence of יהוה over the patrimonial import, showed a changing trend. A new party of informed "elders", (Hebrew (הַזִּקְנִים)), led by Jeroboam I, son of Nebat, already in touch with modern reforms, was advancing an idea for reform in Israelite patrimonialism. The background of Jeroboam I attests to this. According to Hubbard (1982):

Jeroboam son of Nebat seems to have been a wealthy man (1 Kings 11:28) (גְּבוּרַת הָיִל) able to equip himself and others for war, despite the fact that his mother was a widow. Solomon, building the Millo, placed Jeroboam, an Ephraimite, in charge of the work force of the N. tribes. The king's oppressive practices led Jeroboam to forment a revolt, resulting in his exile to Egypt until Solomon's death ... Rehoboam's rash refusal to initiate a more clement policy than his father's brought the fulfillment too Ahijah's prophecy (1 Kings 12:29ff): the kingdom was rent asunder. Benjamin alone remained loyal to Judah, and became a battle ground for a series of border skirmishes between the two kings. (p. 565).

From every available information, Jeroboam was equipped with knowledge about reforms in government systems which, in the first instance he found unagreeable to Solomon's patrimonial private appropriation of public office. So, long before Rehoboam and the split of the kingdom, not only Jeroboam but also a party of reformed elders constituted a dissenting voice to the patrimonial system under Solomon.

Thus, when occasion availed, he took the opportunity to implement the government reforms which he (probably) wished he could have achieved under Solomon's and Rehoboam's reigns. Thus, the repeated reference to "the sin which Jeroboam sinned and which he made Israel to sin" (1 Kings 14:16) was the redactive criticism by the D redactors in favour of the Davidic prophetic party, led by Nathan, who had prophetically eternalized the throne of David.

The Hausa-Fulani Quest for Patrimonial Domination in Nigeria

It must be pointed out the Hausa-Fulani concept of power, directly derived from the Islamic political philosophy, is that power is total, permanent and patrimonial. Till today, the patrimonial system still obtains in many Arab countries and Islamic states. Whitaker (1970) captures this in his assertion that, "Once installed, a Fulani Emir was assailable only through extra-legal means - assassination, civil war, usurpation, sabotage, etc, or through the intervention of external authority" (p. 261). Kukah (1993) concurs that, "When this class engaged in political activities, it did so within the limits of the concept of power in Hausa society, a concept guided by a hierarchically stratified society with the Emir at the top" (p. 5). Further elucidating on this, Whitaker (1970) asserts that:

Those born to rule are at liberty to co-opt others of lower status into the orbit of the ruling class, and after this has been done, the new entrants achieve acquired status (*Shigege*). The dividing line between the ruling class and the ruled (*Talakawa*) is sharp and is best summed up in the Hausa proverb: *Zuriyar sarki ba talakawa ba ne*, (In the family of a king there are no poor people) (p. 415).

Before the unification of the Northern and Southern protectorates to form the nation Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani were already an organized people with a world view and a philosophy of power. Being brought into a country in which a democratic system of power shift would of necessity prevail already presented a fundamental problem to this world view and philosophy of power. What the country has gone through in the power tussle of these past decades attests to this.

In all fairness, the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society is designed for a totalitarian system in which political and religious components are inextricably interwoven and authority flows from the apex of the religio-political authority. For such a society, it is impossible to foresee a system that is organized otherwise. Besides, it is impossible for the Hausa-Fulani Islamic society to foresee a world in which the Islamic law does not hold sway. It is for this reason that all kinds of sporadic crises have taken place in Northern Nigeria now and again. Paden(1973) summed up the situation in his composition:

As for the Christian, what he desires is gain
To cast you, or our Mallams aside
And to cause you to stop applying our Sharia
Which Allah sent down through our Prophet (p.182).

Kukah (1993) told the story of a Northern Christian from Kwande in Plateau state, who had converted to Islam in the days of the First Republic politicking, and had joined the NPC party. He quoted the man, Alhaji Yahaya Kwande as saying:

The NPC was the enemy we knew, we could only fight for our rights within the system. Communication was only in Hausa, and Hausa was the main language of the North, therefore it was necessary to stay. Some of us believed that our presence could counter the Hausa-Fulani control (p. 9).

The total aspiration of the Hausa-Fulani is the establishment of an Islamic state based on the Sharia. This remains the aspiration of Hausa-Fulani Islamic society and nothing short of it is acceptable to them. In fact, it is impossible for them to imagine anything other than that. Suleiman agreed that Jihad was meant:

To make the word of Allah supreme, to bring unbelief and tyranny to naught, to bring dignity and honour to Muslims save them from humiliation of having to live under the influence of an unIslamic power. (p. 4)

This is stating the matter as it is. The Hausa-Fulani feels a deep sense on humiliation in having to be compelled to live under a non-Islamic authority, and in spite of all the creeds and anthems, the heart of the Hausa-Fulani is fundamentally opposed to a non-Islamic authority under which he is compelled to live. The proponents of the nationhood of Nigeria should have considered this fact before embarking on that costly enterprise. Ever since, a lot of blood has been shed in the attempt to make the experiment to work, culminating in the thirty-month civil war that wasted over three million lives, and inter-religious crises that have continued to waste thousands of lives up till this day. To the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, the commitment to the Sharia system is inalienable and uncompromisable. As Kumo (1972) asserts, "The state is subordinate to Sharia, and it is Sharia which lays down the general norms and functions of the state and all the public institutions of the state" (p. 41).

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the concept of power among the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria is inalienably and uncompromisingly tied to the religious traditions of Islam. These traditions are patrimonial in nature, inheritance and transfer. And it is difficult for the Hausa-Fulani to imagine a society that is otherwise structured.

In fairness, it is not the Hausa-Fulani concept of power that is to be faulted, after all they were already running a stable organized society before the arrival of the British colonialists. What is to be faulted rather is the unjust system which has compelled the Hausa-Fulani, against their concept of power, to live within a society where leadership would not be patrimonial, patrilineal and hereditary, but based on some centralized Western ideals of democracy. It is on this spot that the political crisis of Nigeria is hinged. The Hausa-Fulani are not democratic by orientation, nor are democratic principles in consonance with the patrimonial structures of their concept of power.

In Nigeria, power has shifted from the North (the Hausa-Fulani Islamic network) for about ten years. In growing impatience for this considered anomaly, the more radical wing of the Hausa-Fulani religion of Islam, called *Boko Haram*, has gone on rampage, unleashing mayhem on the country particularly in the North East. This situation is already threatening the corporate existence of the country and more importantly bringing to the fore the fact that the Hausa-Fulani, by their fundamental orientation and understanding of power, cannot exist in a society which is

not patrimonial in nature, that is one in which power is bequeathed along the family line and that in which there is an inseparable fusion between the political and the religious authorities. As already stated, it is not the Hausa-Fulani concept of power and religio-political fusion that is faulty or can be faulty. It is rather the situation that compels them to live against their wish in a political state whose structure is contrary to their world view that needs to be addressed in order to achieve a lasting peace in the country.

In the text of our consideration in 1 Kings 12, the excessive private appropriation of public office in the patrimonial system eventually led to a revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty, leading to a break in the kingdom in an episode in which, according to the prophetic party led by Ahijah, יהוה had actually supported. Perhaps in the Nigerian situation the discomfort being generated by the Hausa-Fulani quest for patrimonial domination, as supported by their religion may ultimately lead to the snapping of the collective stake, if that turns out to be the only way to have lasting peace and guarantee of life and property in the country.

Conclusion

The narratives regarding monarchy in Israel present two conflicting notions of the role of patrimonialism in the collapse of monarchy. A prophetic party, led by Nathan, speaking for יהוה establishes the Davidic patrimonial dynasty eternally. Another prophetic party, led by Ahijah, again speaking for יהוה legitimizes the revolt against the Davidic patrimonial dynasty. The narrative thus betrays the ambivalence of יהוה over patrimonialism. However, internal evidence shows that the source of the conflict is from two redactional schools of thought. While the D post-exilic reflection on monarchy establishes patrimonialism as an indispensable component of Israelite monarchy, an enlightened reform group led by Jeroboam son of Nebat, backed by the prophetic party of Ahijah, advocates reforms as way of preserving the polity.

In Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani of the North have a world view which is patrimonial in nature, and one in which there is a total fusion between religion and the state. The Hausa-Fulani cannot envision a situation in which religious laws are not implemented in the state, nor can they exist in a society in which political authority does not issue from religious leadership. Thus, the Hausa-Fulani world view is not in consonance with a democratic norm in which power has to be rotatory, leading to the possibility of being exposed to the humiliation of having to be subjected under a non-Islamic authority. The Hausa-Fulani world view cannot be faulted in that it serves the people effectively and has been serving them well prior to the intervention of the colonialists. What is to be faulted instead is the creation of the system which compels the Hausa-Fulani to live against their notion of power and authority. The prolonged negation of the Hausa-Fulani Islamic world view in Nigeria has given rise to a situation in which the more radical segment of the religion, called Boko Haram, has taken up arms against the constituted authority in the country. In line with the event of the split of the Israelite kingdom in 1 Kings 12, which forms the fulcrum of this discourse, it is probable that the only way to have lasting peace in Nigeria and guarantee safety of life and property is to dismantle the system which compels the Hausa-Fulani to live in negation of their religio-political orientation and conviction, rather than continue, albeit unsuccessfully, to attempt to change their religio-political orientation and conviction altogether, at the huge cost of lives and property.

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